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The argument from existence, blood-sports, and ‘sport-slaves’ 
 
Introduction 
In the UK at least, shooting birds for sport or what is called ‘game-birding’ is a 
fairly established pastime. Whilst some birds used in the sports-shooting industry are 
reared by free-range methods, many are intensively reared for the purpose of shooting for 
sport. During the shooting season, these birds are released into designated areas where 
‘beaters’ drive the birds out of the undergrowth and into the sky, so as to make the birds 
visible to shoot (this form of shooting is known as Driven-Game Shooting). Most of these 
birds are shot for recreational purposes.  
It has been reported that millions of game-birds are bred each year for the UK 
sports-shooting industry (Shooting Times, 2009, p.7; cited by Animal Aid, 2010, p.1). 
With numbers like this, the production of game-birds often involves intensive-rearing. As 
with all intensive-rearing methods of farming, the production and rearing of game-birds 
using such methods raises a considerable number of welfare issues. The Farm Animal 
Welfare Council has claimed that such welfare issues relate to, amongst other things, the 
housing systems used (systems which provide a ‘barren environment’), mortality rates, 
and the confinement of the birds (the birds are often confined to such an extent that they 
are unable to exercise their natural tendencies) (FAWC, 2008, pp.8-14). It is not 
surprisingly, then, that intensively-reared game-birds tend to display symptoms of severe 
stress. The humane way to prevent the birds from enduring such stress would be to 
improve the conditions in which the birds are kept. However, the birds’ stress behaviour 
is often controlled by fitting the birds with restraint devices, which further restrict the 
birds from exercising their instinctive tendencies. Indeed, the FAWC has claimed that the 
use of such devices is another factor that raises a number of welfare issues (ibid.). 
While there is evidence to show that these birds suffer a great deal,1 in this paper I 
will not focus on whether game-birding is morally permissible but rather will focus on a 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, the first official inquiry by the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) into the rearing 
of game birds (2008). See also Animal Aid’s ‘The Trouble with Shooting’ (2010).  
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particular argument used in the animal ethics debates; that argument being what I shall 
call ‘the argument from existence’.2  
Even so, for the purpose of setting the context, it should be said that most, if not 
all, animal welfarists would no doubt argue that the practice of sports-shooting and in 
particular rearing birds (most noticeably, pheasants and partridges) for the purpose of 
sport is wrong, either because of the suffering the birds endure for sport, or because of the 
fact that these birds are killed purely for the purpose of sport, or both. Thus the animal 
welfarist would no doubt object to blood-sport as a practice. And it is indeed reasonable 
to suppose that however much one wants to pursue one’s ‘interest’ in blood-sport or 
game-birding (if it can be described as an ‘interest’ in the philosophical sense) this 
interest is not weighty enough to justify causing substantial suffering to another being or 
killing such a being. (‘Animal welfarists’ here should be taken to refer widely to those 
who recognise the moral standing of animals and as such to those who advocate giving 
animals’ interests due moral consideration.) 
This paper will discuss a common objection to the animal welfarist’s position just 
outlined; that objection taking the form of the previously mentioned ‘argument from 
existence’. This argument is often used in support of our use of animals in commercial 
practices such as sports-shooting, and can be used as an attempted justification for the 
suffering and killing of animals in such practices. The argument tends to crop up in one 
form or another not just in discussions about blood-sport, but frequently rears its head in 
other discussions in animal ethics, and is often put forward by lay-persons and 
philosophers alike.3 My objective in this paper is to show just how problematic this 
argument is, with the perhaps overly ambitious aim of laying the argument to rest once 
and for all. 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of the ethics of shooting birds for sport and of the moral permissibility of game-birding, 
see [author reference]. The current paper on the argument from existence is a development of a small 
section of the aforementioned paper; a paper which was primarily concerned with an ethical analysis of 
shooting birds for sport, but which provided a brief summary of the argument from existence. That brief 
summary has been incorporated into this paper (with permission from Taylor and Francis). 
3
 This argument has been used by philosophers for some time (and continues to be presented during the 
question period at conferences). See Leslie Stephen, Social Rights and Duties (1896), quoted by Henry 
Salt, ‘The Logic of the Larder’ (1976); D.G. Ritchie, ‘Why Animals Do Not Have Rights’ (1976); and 
Michael Leahy, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective (1991), p.210. 
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I will provide an analysis of the argument from existence primarily within the 
context of blood-sports and will do so by applying the argument to the example of game-
birding. However, my analysis of the argument will go beyond this context as I will also 
apply the argument to relevant examples concerning human beings. It is necessary that 
the analysis goes beyond the animal ethics context in order to reveal the troublesome 
implications of the argument and in doing so I will highlight the sorts of unethical 
practices this argument supports. In particular, I will discuss how the argument from 
existence could be used to justify the ownership of slaves who were reared for slavery.  
Further the argument from existence raises interesting issues concerning the 
distinction between having a life and living, or worthwhile life and mere existence, as 
well as issues surrounding our responsibilities in relation to prospective beings that we 
are considering bringing into existence and to actual beings that we have purposely 
generated, human children included. Obviously these issues are far reaching and are 
relevant to many areas in applied ethics, including medical ethics for example. However, 
the analysis provided in this paper will seek to address these issues as they relate to the 
argument from existence only, for it is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the 
areas in which these issues can be applied. 
 
The first form of the argument from existence 
So what is the argument from existence? Well, as said above, it is often used in response 
to the animal welfarist’s position, and can be used as an attempted justification for the 
suffering and killing of animals used for commercial purposes. Here I will apply it to the 
context of game-birding. There are two forms of the argument. While responses to both 
forms utilise the example of slavery, as well as involve ethical issues surrounding the 
generation of beings, responses to the first form centre on the themes of suffering and 
worthwhile life, and responses to the second form centre on the themes of killing and 
death.  
The first way the argument from existence can be presented is as follows. The 
suffering caused to intensively reared game-birds for the purpose of sport is the price they 
have to pay for existing, for without being bred to be subjected to the factory-farming 
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system they would not have existed. The way these animals are treated is deemed 
acceptable as they would not exist otherwise. 
However, it could be argued that it is not mere existence as such that we value. We 
do not value just any kind of life. Indeed, it is not any existence whatsoever that we 
value, but an existence that has value. There are some lives that are of such low quality 
that they are not worth living or having as a form of existence. Such lives may include the 
lives of animals reared in factory-farms for the purpose of shooting-sports, and if so the 
distress and suffering of animals kept in factory-farm conditions (in this case, for the 
purpose of sport) cannot be compensated for by their mere existence.  
And if we consider that such lives may also include human ones, we can begin to 
see how an analysis of the first form of the argument from existence raises issues relevant 
to the context of human beings. The same argument could also be used to justify vicious 
forms of slavery and other types of human exploitation, where humans were reared for 
slavery or reared to be exploited in some way or another.  
But for humans, as well as for animals, mere existence itself is not some kind of 
good or benefit, as opposed to a flourishing life (which in the context of human beings, 
could be seen as something approximate to a worthwhile life). And if a being’s life or 
existence is not worthwhile or not one in which it is able to flourish then it cannot 
compensate for its pains and distresses (see Clark, 1977, p.59).4 
Contrary to what the first form of the argument from existence suggests, it might be 
fairer to say that it would have been better for some animals and for some humans had 
they not been born at all, rather than be born into a life where they are significantly 
prevented from flourishing or not capable of flourishing. As far as some possible beings 
are concerned, say possible animals reared in factory-farms for the purpose of sport, we 
may have a negative obligation not to bring them into existence when we know that their 
existence will be one of pain, suffering and misery. 
Those that consider bringing beings into existence should take into account the 
quality of life that those beings will have and, when it is known that the beings concerned 
                                                 
4
 Stephen Clark argues that ‘if existence is not an advantage to the individual concerned it cannot 
compensate him for his manifold distresses’ (Clark, 1977, p.59). 
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will have pitiful lives, possibly refrain from bringing those beings into existence. Further, 
those that do decide to bring beings into existence have a responsibility for the quality of 
life of those beings at least for the duration of their own lifetimes; a responsibility that 
carries with it strong and positive obligations. As Robin Attfield says in the context of 
genetic engineering, 
 
It is wrong to generate creatures which lead lives more truncated than ones 
which the same agents could have brought into existence instead… When 
people become responsible… for the quality of life liveable by animals… this 
confers strong obligations, and does not give them carte blanche to manipulate 
as they please. Even creation has its ethics (1998, p.188).  
 
We would consider it wrong if we brought into existence people who were to be 
harmfully confined and forced to live a life unnatural to their own kind for our own 
benefit, and the same logic applies to animals. 
We have found then that birds reared for sport by methods that cause considerable 
suffering cannot be compensated for the conditions they live in by the mere fact of their 
own existence. That humans purposely cause these birds’ existence is no justification for 
causing the suffering of such animals. Indeed, we may have negative obligations not to 
bring these animals into existence when we know that their lives will not be worth living, 
but if we bring animals into existence then this confers strong obligations in respect of 
their quality of life. The first form of the argument from existence (presented as it is, as 
an objection to the animals welfarist’s position) should then be rejected as implausible. 
 
The second form of the argument from existence 
The second way the argument from existence can be presented is as follows. While the 
suffering of birds raised in factory-farming conditions is wrong and cannot be 
compensated for by their existence, the killing and shooting of birds (for sport) not raised 
in such conditions (but raised in good conditions) is not wrong, since were they not bred 
for sport they would not have existed, and it is better to have lived, and to have lived a 
relatively good life, than not to have lived at all (even if that life is cut short). Further, it 
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is argued that if people were to stop shooting birds for sport then there would be no 
reason to breed these birds, and thus they would not have had a life at all.  
Now, this presentation of the argument is certainly more cogent than the former 
one. If game-birds are reared in conditions that promote their welfare then it is likely that 
they will live lives in which their interests are taken into account. Further the living of a 
relatively good life may outweigh the harm caused by a premature death.  
This seems plausible at first, but if we assume that the birds have worthwhile 
lives, the living of which outweighs the harm caused by a premature death, a problem 
still arises from the fact that the birds are killed yet they have an existence that is 
worthwhile, for if a being’s existence is worthwhile, then to kill it and end its existence is 
to injure it (see Clark, 1977, p.59).5 So, while it is true that the birds would not have 
existed were they not bred for sports-hunting, and that if one removes the hunt one would 
also remove the future existence of many game-birds, this in itself does not justify their 
killing.  
It is worth noting that the reasons for bringing creatures into existence in order 
that they will be killed are important to the ethics of generating such lives and the killing 
of such creatures. For example, there may be cases in which there are significant interests 
at stake; interests that depend on the bringing of creatures into existence and the killing of 
those creatures. The life interests of the creatures brought into existence, in such cases, 
may be less weighty or less significant than the other interests at stake. Bringing animals 
into existence to be used in experiments for the purpose of medical research is a relevant 
example here. Millions of animals are bred solely for the purpose of medical research, 
and those animals will inevitably be killed after the research has been completed. As 
controversial as this is, it is often claimed that they are bred and their lives are 
‘sacrificed’ for weighty reasons. 
But what ‘weighty reasons’ might be put forth for claiming that sacrificing the 
lives of animals in experiments is justifiable? While it may be thought that appeals to 
new knowledge or benefits for humans are enough to override animals’ significant 
                                                 
5
 Clark argues that if existence is an advantage to the creature concerned then ‘to strip a creature of 
existence is to injure him’ (Clark, 1977, p.59). While existence as such is not a blessing or an advantage 
(see section above, i.e., ‘The first form of the argument from existence’), Clark could be interpreted here as  
meaning that where a creature’s existence has value then to kill that being is to injure it. 
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interests in continued existence, appeals need to be backed up and justified; such appeals 
do not stand alone. For a start, in order for such significant interests to be justifiably 
overridden by human benefits or new knowledge, we would have to identify the humans 
involved in those benefits, show that those humans had interests which were of greater 
moral significance than the life interests of the animals involved, and that those human 
interests would be directly affected for the worse if such experiments were not carried 
out. Such appeals would also have to show that any suffering of the animals involved was 
justifiable, and that such suffering would be justifiable if inflicted upon humans with 
similar life interests who, like animals, cannot consent to their being experimented on 
(otherwise we can be accused of inconsistency at best, or speciesism at worst).  
There may, of course, be some experiments we are prepared to do on humans who 
cannot consent and, in such cases, experimenting on certain animals may be justifiable. In 
addition, it may be that some human experiments may drastically reduce the suffering of 
those very humans being experimented upon, and therefore may be permissible. 
Likewise, it may be that some animal experiments may drastically reduce the suffering of 
those very animals being experimented upon, and therefore may also be justifiable. So we 
may have good reasons, and unbiased ones at that, for saying that some experiments are 
permissible.  
However, purposely generating large numbers of animals for research is more 
difficult to justify. If we assume for argument’s sake that some animal (and human) 
experiments are permissible, it does not thereby follow that purposely generating large 
numbers of animals for use in research is permissible. Even if we suppose that the life 
interests of the animals to be generated would be less morally significant than the human 
interests for which their lives are ‘sacrificed’, we should ask ourselves whether we would 
be prepared to purposely generate large numbers of humans (for use in research, knowing 
that they will be killed inevitably) with comparable life interests to the animals 
concerned. (See ‘Sport-slaves’ section for a discussion of the value of human and animal 
life.) I expect most of us would answer this question with a resounding ‘no’; under no 
circumstances would we be prepared to generate large numbers of humans with 
comparable life interests to the animals in question which we are considering bringing 
into existence. But if we are not prepared to do this then, in all consistency, we must be 
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wary of our readiness to claim that bringing millions of animals into existence, with 
comparable life interests to some humans, for the purpose of medical research is 
acceptable, albeit animals whose life interests are less significant than the other interests 
at stake. That said this is compatible with the claim that the interests of some creatures 
may be less morally significant than the interests of others, and that where interests 
conflict, comparative judgments should be made. Indeed, those who support the 
arguments put forward in this paper against the argument from existence are free to 
recognise this.   
Returning to the case of game-birding, bringing birds into existence for the sole 
purpose of sport does not seem to be a weighty enough reason to justify the act of 
generating beings for killing, especially in the light of the other less significant interests 
at stake (the interests of, for example, shooting-sports enthusiasts in pursuing a particular 
pastime). As far as possible future game-birds are concerned, we may have an obligation 
not to bring them into existence when we know they will suffer a premature death for the 
purpose of sport. Bringing lives into existence is a serious moral act, and, as said 
suggested above, those who decide to act to bring beings into existence have a 
responsibility for seriously considering the interests of those beings (Attfield, 1998, 
p.188), including their interests in life.  
A reply may be anticipated here. We can agree that is it wrong to bring a being 
into existence when we know it would have a life not worth living, and most would agree 
that to bring such a being into existence is to cause that being harm and to confer on that 
being a significant injury. As such, we can also agree that the first form of the argument 
from existence is indeed problematic. But what of bringing a being into existence when 
we know it will live a good life? If bringing about terrible lives is bad and disadvantages 
the relevant beings, it seems difficult to deny that bringing about worthwhile lives is good 
and benefits the relevant beings (see Singer, 1995, p.228). Does this reflection not deem 
the second form of the argument plausible? 
In response, we could choose not to deny this and say, “Yes, bringing about 
worthwhile lives is good” and that this certainly makes the second form of the argument 
more plausible than the first.  But the second form of the argument from existence, 
applied to game-birding, does not only say that bringing about worthwhile lives is good; 
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this is not all the argument does. The argument is presented in such a way that it 
condones the killing of birds for sport on the grounds that if they were not bred for blood-
sport or bred to be killed in sporting activities then they would not have existed at all, and 
as such would not have had a worthwhile life. Thus the second form of the argument tries 
to support the killing of birds for sport by appealing to their worthwhile existence. This is 
how the argument has to be presented if it is to stand as an objection to the animal 
welfarist position, for it does no harm to the animal welfarist’s stance for her to agree that 
the bringing about of worthwhile lives is good. It is of course not the bringing about of 
worthwhile lives that she objects too, but rather, in the context of this paper, the practice 
of blood-sport. 
But if we accept that bringing about worthwhile lives is good and benefits the 
relevant beings, this is not a justification for bringing beings into existence in order that 
they may be killed (and we shall see more clearly why this is so when the argument is 
applied to the example of slavery, below). As said above, those that bring beings into 
existence have a responsibility for considering the interests of those beings, especially 
weighty interests which should include their interest in continued existence. That one has 
brought beings into existence which will live good lives goes nowhere in justifying one’s 
killing of those beings. In other words, when we have benefited a being by bringing about 
its worthwhile life, this does not permit us to deprive that being of that which we have 
bestowed. If a being does have a good life, then death takes away all that is good and as 
such is the greatest of losses (Nagel, 1986). As Nagel defensibly observed, the good of 
life can be multiplied by time; more is better than less (ibid.).  
Indeed, the period of time after our death is time that death deprives us of. This is 
not true of the period of non-existence before birth. This explains the differences in our 
attitudes towards these two periods of non-existence (ibid.), but in addition it may explain 
some differences in our obligations. By taking away a being’s life prematurely we are 
very much depriving it in a way we would not be depriving it by not bringing that being 
into existence (even when we know it would have a good life). Bringing about 
worthwhile lives may be good, but not bringing about those lives is not a deprivation in 
the way that taking lives is a deprivation. While we consider people who bring creatures 
into existence as having positive responsibilities with regard to the interests of those 
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creatures, including their interest in continued existence, we do not see people who 
decide not to have children as having obligations to bring children into existence who 
will live good lives,6 and the same reasoning could apply to the second form of the 
argument from existence. That is, there is no reason to suppose that we have obligations 
to bring game-birds into existence even when we know they will not live in the 
conditions of the factory-farm, and there is no reason to think that breeding birds for sport 
serves as a moral justification for bringing beings into existence that would not have lived 
were they not bred for killing for sport, even if, before being killed, they lead flourishing 
lives. 
 
Sport-slaves 
Moreover, the second form of the argument implies that if a practice existed whereby 
humans were bred specifically to be shot for sport (say, as slaves to be used in sporting 
activities) then that practice could be morally right, and that it would be right to support 
the continuance of such a practice if the humans lived in humane conditions and their 
interests were taken into account. In line with the second form of the argument, it could 
be analogously argued that if such humans had not been bred to be killed and suffer a 
premature death then they would not have existed, and it is better that they should live 
and live a life which is relatively good, than not to have lived at all, even if their lives 
will be cut short.  
However, while it may be true that it is better to live a good life, even one that 
will be purposely cut short, than not to have lived at all, this is no justification for a 
practice which aims to breed creatures in order to kill them for sport. The very existence 
of the human sports-slaves in this hypothetical example is no justification for their killing 
or for a practice which breeds them for sport. Of course we could argue that for these 
humans it is better that they have lived and lived a relatively good life than not to have 
lived at all, but the fact that they do exist does not provide a justification for the practice 
that brought them into existence.  
                                                 
6
 Saul Smilansky, however, argues that, in certain circumstances, some people could have responsibilities 
to have children (1995, pp.42-53).  
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Once again, a reply might be envisaged. It could be replied that human life has 
more value than animal life, and it is the value of human life that makes the killing of 
humans in the hypothetical example wrong, as well as morally distinct from the killing of 
game-birds. Of course, one could agree with this and say that it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that different lives have different value in respect of different capacities and 
potentialities. Indeed, Peter Singer argues that ‘the life of a self-aware being, capable of 
abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, 
is more valuable than a being without these capacities’ (1995, p.20). To kill creatures that 
possess such capacities is to deprive them of future goals, plans and potentials (ibid., 
p.21). Further one generally finds that beings which possess these capacities to a great 
extent have more complex lives than those whose capacities are somewhat limited in 
comparison. There appears to be a correlation between the possession of capacities and 
complexity of life. And the greater a being’s capacities the more it stands to lose from 
death.  
It should be noted that, for Singer, the wrongness of killing animals is related to 
whether they are self-conscious: self-conscious creatures, or persons, are capable are 
having a concept of themselves over time and making plans for the future, and because of 
this they have an interest in not being killed. Creatures that are not self-conscious do not 
have such an interest, and as such are deemed replaceable (Singer, 1993, pp. 131-34). 
Pigs, cattle, sheep and dogs are among the animals which Singer believes, with ‘varying 
degrees of confidence’, to be self-conscious (Singer, 1993, p.132), and so rearing these 
animals for food is considered to be wrong irrespective of the suffering they endure, but 
many animals reared for food, including birds, are not considered to be persons, and as 
such have no interest in continued existence. Of course, Singer still strongly (and 
forcefully) objects to the use of all sentient animals in commercial practices, including 
factory-farming and animal experimentation, but his overall objection is not that the 
animals used are killed, but that they are made to endure considerable suffering. If Singer 
considers birds to be replaceable, then it is fair to say that he would consider partridges 
and pheasants to be replaceable.   
However, animals which are not self-conscious do stand to lose something from 
death. As Attfield argues, ‘Death is a deprivation… for… nonhuman creatures whose 
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essential capacities are unfulfilled. But the greater the extent to which creatures are 
capable of plans and projects… or of the development of conscious relationships, the 
more they stand to be deprived of by death, and the more value is present in the kind of 
lives which they lead’ (1995, p.90). Irrespective of whether game-birds have a concept of 
themselves over time or can be classed as ‘persons’, killing them deprives them of 
something; it deprives them of fulfilling their potentialities and of exercising their 
capacities (including perceptual ones). So contrary to what Singer’s arguments may 
imply with respect to the case of game-birding, pheasants and partridges should not be 
considered as replaceable, but rather should be considered as beings that surely do have 
an interest in continued existence, albeit an interest that is, all other things being equal, 
not as weighty as a self-conscious being’s interest in life. On the view presented here then 
it does not follow, pace Singer, that beings that lack a concept of themselves over time 
are replaceable. 
  Accordingly, with respect to the argument from existence, the problems still 
remain; the claim that human life has more value than animal life does not rescue the 
argument. The reason for this is that animal life still has value, albeit a value that is 
arguably less than human life. As with humans, death deprives animals from developing 
and fulfilling all those potentialities and capacities that they could have fulfilled in life 
(ibid.), irrespective of whether their lives are more or less valuable than human ones. So 
the fact that some game birds live a relatively good life, which they would not have had if 
they did not exist, does nothing to justify their killing or their lives being purposely cut 
short, for if these animals live good lives, then to kill them is to deprive or injure them. 
(Besides, it is arguable as to whether the lives of animals are always of less value than the 
lives of humans. There are some human lives that are of such low quality that, when 
making comparative judgements, we might not want to say that such lives are of greater 
value than the lives of some animals.)  
At first sight then the second form of the argument from existence seems 
reasonable (and is more cogent than the first form because it does not view the mere 
existence of game-birds as compensation for their misery), yet on closer inspection it is 
problematic and, just like the first form, could be used as an attempted justification for 
certain forms of slavery, such as human sports-slaves. As such, it should be rejected.  
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One further major problem with the argument from existence in both its forms, 
applied to the animal context and to the human one, is that it makes animals reared for 
blood-sports as well as slaves reared for slavery somehow beneficiaries of humanity. 
What Henry Salt with irony entitled the ‘Logic of the Larder’ is relevant here, for 
although Salt talked of the Logic of the Larder with reference to eating animals, his 
words get to the heart of the matter in illuminating the problematic nature of the 
argument from existence. Salt imagines the argument from the standpoint of the 
Philosopher and of the Pig. From the standpoint of the Philosopher, ‘Blessed is the Pig, 
for the Philosopher is fond of bacon’. Indeed, it is as if the Philosopher were saying, ‘I 
have been a benefactor to this Pig… in so much as I ate a portion of his predecessor; and 
now I will be a benefactor to some yet unborn pig, by eating a portion of this one’ (Salt, 
1976 [1914], p.186). But how might the animal, or, as Henry Salt imagines, the pig, 
respond to such an argument?:  
 
“Revered moralist,” he might plead… “to my porcine intellect it appeareth 
that having first determined to kill and devour me, thou hast afterwards 
bestirred thee to find a moral reason. For mark… that in my entry into the 
world my own predilection was in no course considered, nor did I purchase 
life on condition of my own butchery… but though thou hast not spared my 
life, at least spare me thy sophistry. It is not for his sake, but for thine, that in 
his life the Pig is filthily housed and fed, and at the end barbarously 
butchered” (ibid., pp.186-87). 
 
As Salt says, and rightly so, ‘The logic of the larder is the very negation of a true 
reverence for life; for it implies that the real lover of animals is he whose larder is fullest 
of them’ (ibid., p.188), and we might add, in the context of bloodsports, he who enjoys 
killing them. Indeed, a case made in favour of animal exploitation (or human 
exploitation) on the basis of animal existence (or human existence) is a poor one.  
 
Meat eating 
It was said at the beginning of this paper that the argument from existence is often 
applied to a range of practices that use animals, and this includes farming practices for 
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animal food production. While the suffering of factory-farmed animals cannot be 
compensated for by their mere existence, supporters of the argument from existence may 
argue (using the second form of the argument) that the killing of farm animals raised in 
free-range conditions is not wrong, since were they not bred for food they would not have 
existed, and it is better for these animals to have lived a good life than not to have lived at 
all.  
All the arguments that were presented against the second form of the argument from 
existence in relation to game-birding also apply to the argument from existence in 
relation to free-range farming animals for non-essential purposes, including non-essential 
meat production. However, it is worth pointing out that even if the argument from 
existence were used to try to defend what one might consider as essential meat-
production, then some of the counter-arguments presented in this paper would still apply. 
This does not mean that essential meat production cannot be defended, but it does mean 
that it cannot be defended by the argument from existence. For example, the very fact that 
free-range animals exist and live a relatively good life in itself does not provide a 
justification for the practice that brought them into existence nor does it provide a 
justification for depriving animals of future fulfilments. Appeals to the worthwhile 
existence of creatures (both human and nonhuman) do not support the killing of those 
creatures, and this is so irrespective of whether they are bred for essential reasons.  
Of course, as said in the third section of this paper, the reasons for bringing 
creatures into existence in order that they will be killed are important to the ethics of 
generating such lives and the killing of such creatures, and they should be taken into 
account when thinking about whether or not a practice is permissible, but the argument 
for existence, even if it is applied to cases where animals are bred for weighty reasons, 
would attempt to condone the killing of the relevant animals on the very basis that had 
they not been bred to be killed (for whatever reason) then they would not have existed at 
all and would not have had a worthwhile life. But, again, the very fact that one provides 
animals with a good life does not, in itself, permit one to then take away that which one 
has bestowed. As such, any attempted justifications for killing animals for their flesh will 
have to take the form of something other than the second form of the argument from 
existence. The argument is fraught with problems, and appeals to the argument to support 
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practices which involve creating creatures intended to be killed will no doubt be just as 
problematic.  
While the arguments presented in this paper against the argument from existence 
serve to show the troublesome nature of the argument, they do not thereby serve to 
provide an ethical analysis of the moral permissibility of various commercial practices 
that use animals. However, it was said above (in the section on the second form of the 
argument from existence) that the arguments presented against the argument from 
existence do not prevent us from making comparative judgments of moral weight in cases 
where the interests of two or more creatures conflict, and it was also said that the reasons 
for creating animals intended to be killed are important to a consideration of whether our 
actions in this regard are permissible, and this suggests the way in which an ethical 
analysis may proceed. Indeed, an analysis of whether a practice is justifiable will no 
doubt involve a consideration of the interests at stake. In cases where the interests at stake 
are human ones, then we think it right to suppose that basic, weighty interests, such as an 
interest in not suffering and an interest in continued existence, should take moral 
precedence over non-basic, less weighty ones, such as an ‘interest’ in pursuing a 
particular pastime. There is no reason why this should not be the case when the 
conflicting interests at stake are animal and human ones. As said in the introduction, it is 
reasonable to claim that one’s interest in sports-shooting is not weighty enough to justify 
causing suffering to another being or killing another being.  
Much the same applies to other cases that involve using animals for our own 
benefit. In the case of factory-farming animals for food, animals’ basic interests in not 
suffering and in continued existence are overridden by the human preference in eating a 
particular diet, and this preference is not a weighty enough reason to override such basic 
interests. Often the reply is given that although animals suffer through factory-farming 
methods and are inevitably killed for their flesh, the ‘suffering’ humans would have to 
endure if they could not eat meat overrides the animals’ interests in not suffering and in 
continued existence. Such an argument, however, will just not do. Having to experience a 
diet without meat is not suffering. The majority of the world’s population eats very little 
meat, and eating meat (most notably, in the West) is usually about satisfying taste-buds, 
rather than satisfying basic needs.  
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However, there are other cases where rearing animals for food involves the 
weighting of much more significant human interests. Consider, for example, a case of a 
woman in a poverty-stricken country, desperate to feed her family. She may have a small 
number of farm animals which she rears for food; say a few goats and a number of 
chickens. Indeed, many people in very poor parts of the world rely on their livestock for 
sustenance and as a food source. Now, following Singer, and digressing slightly, we may 
consider that like interests should be given equal consideration (see Singer, 1993, ch.3 ), 
and in the case of factory-farming, the suffering of the animals should be given equal 
consideration to the like suffering of humans. Accordingly, if we believe that it would be 
unjustifiable to inflict on humans the suffering that we inflict on animals in factory-farms, 
then we must, to be consistent, also believe that the suffering we cause to animals in 
factory-farms is unjustifiable. But consider also that the principle of equal consideration 
of interests allows for comparative judgments to be made (not all beings will have an 
equal interest in life or continued existence) and that in the case above, of a woman 
desperate to feed her family, there are significant human life interests at stake. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that, in this case, the life interests of the woman and her family 
have greater moral significance than the life interests of the animals concerned, perhaps 
because humans have more complex lives and greater capacities than goats and chickens. 
In respect of the humans’ capacities and potentialities, it appears that they stand to lose 
more from death than the chickens and goats. In cases such as this, then, raising and 
killing limited numbers of animals for food may not be unjustifiable. That said even 
though the life interests of the humans override the life interests of the animals, it could 
still be argued that it would be unjustifiable to rear the animals in the conditions of the 
factory-farm, as although the humans and animals in the case in question have different 
life interests, they both have similar interests in not suffering.  
So even if we consider just two of the most basic interests of animals, that is, an 
interest in not suffering and an interest in life, while these may suffice to show that most 
farming of animals is wrong, and factory-farming is certainly always unjustifiable, it does 
not follow that eating meat is wrong per se; indeed, certain forms of free-range farming 
may be justifiable in certain circumstances, for example, where there is limited or little 
protein available, or where food is scarce.  
 18
However, none of this affects the implausibility of the argument from existence, 
even in its more cogent form. While a detailed ethical analysis of the killing of animals 
for food is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope that the above paragraphs will reveal 
something about what such an analysis should involve; specifically, that deliberations 
regarding justification should involve comparative judgments of moral weight, taking 
into account all the relevant interests at stake, rather than an appeal to the argument from 
existence.   
 
Conclusion 
So we have seen that the argument from existence, in both its forms, is implausible. The 
first form, applied to game-birding, argues that the suffering that game-birds endure in 
the course of their lives is the price they pay for existing. However, this argument fails to 
make the distinction between mere existence and worthwhile or flourishing life, and in 
doing so fails to give due recognition to that which is valuable about life. The logic of the 
first form of the argument would also justify the rearing of humans for slavery who were 
to be dealt a miserable existence; this in itself should be enough to sink the first form. 
The second form of the argument from existence is more subtle, but it too should 
be rejected. We have seen that the second form, applied again to game-birding, argues 
that it is better that birds should live and live a life which is relatively good, than not live 
at all, even if their lives are ones which will be cut short. However, accepting that some 
game-birds have good lives does little to rescue the argument from existence, for if we 
kill animals that have a good life then we manifestly injure those animals and deprive 
them of future fulfillments. As such, the second form of the argument from existence, 
used as it is here, that is, as an objection to the animal welfarist’s stance and in support of 
blood-sport as a practice, is implausible (and does nothing to weaken the animal 
welfarist’s arguments against blood-sports). A further problem with the second form of 
the argument is that, like the first form of the argument, it could also be used to justify the 
rearing of humans as slaves, but unlike the first form, only if those humans were to live 
relatively good lives. However, this is still unacceptable.  
Moreover, for both forms of the argument from existence, beings that are 
purposely brought into existence to be purposely killed and / or exploited are somehow 
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viewed as beneficiaries of humanity, and this is at best problematic, and at worst, 
ludicrous. Therefore, the argument from existence presented as an objection to the animal 
welfarist’s position should be rejected.  
This conclusion can be endorsed by consequentialists who believe our 
responsibilities towards animals involve promoting the good of animals. And it can be 
supported by different varieties of consequentialism, especially capacities-based 
consequentialist approaches to animal ethics which locate value in the thriving or 
flourishing of creatures (a thriving which involves the development and exercising of 
creatures’ species-specific capacities and potentialities). (For a detailed outline of the 
relation between flourishing and the development of essential capacities, see Attfield, 
1995, ch.4.)  
However, rights-based theorists who believe that animals’ lives have inherent 
value (see, for example, Tom Regan, 1998, p.51) and that we have a duty not to harm 
existing animals could endorse the conclusion of this paper, as could virtue ethicists who 
reject the logic of the larder as self-interested and who believe that sports-shooting does 
not uphold the virtues of kindness and compassion towards animals, but rather promotes 
a certain degree of callousness towards animals. (For a virtue-based approach to animal 
ethics, see Rosalind Hursthouse, 2000 and 2006.) Recognising this may enable us not to 
lose sight of the varying reasons that different theorists may have for rejecting the 
argument.  
Those who think the argument still stands in context of animal ethics could of 
course continue to raise the argument if they wish, but then they must accept and stand by 
its troublesome and uncomfortable implications when applied to the context of human 
beings, and it is reasonable to suppose that this is something which most would be 
unwilling to do.  
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